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CORPORAXIONS.

CollateralAttacks on Corporations. Edward H. Warren.
A. De Facto Corporations.
Probably the best way to give a fair idea of the content of this
article is to present the author's own summary which he gives at the
conclusion of the paper, as follows,. When the existence of a corporation is only collaterally in issue,
proof of facts sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the de Jacto
doctrine is sufficient to make a piima facie case.
2. If a corporation is in existence, but there is a ground upon
which the state might have its existence forfeited, no one but the
state can take advantage of this cause of forfeiture.
. 3. Most failures to conform strictly to statutory provisions regarding the formation and regulation of corporations are not fatal to the
formation of a de fure corporation. But failure to perform an act,
the performance of which the legislature has intended to be a condition precedent to incorporation, is necessarily fatal.
4 . There are cbnsiderations of public policy so urgent as to justify
the courts in holding that a de facto corporation may be a conduit of
title.
. S. The de facto doctrine has a very important scope in cases where
contracts have been made on a corporate basis.
6. If associates who have not the corporate privilege assume to
exercise it, there is no established doctrine that all but the state must
submit. It is not proper to apply to such a case the doctrine that the
existence of a corporation cannot be attacked collaterally.
7. The .de facto doctrine should be applied with caution when it is"
invoked for the benefit of the associates themselves against persons
who have not dealt with them as a corporation. It is anomalous to
permit the usurper of a right to require a stranger to submit to the
assertion of such a right.
8. It is anomalous to bridge a legal gap, even for the benefit of a
person
who has made an expenditure in good faith.
fi 9 . There may be no objection to applying the doctrine for the benefit of the associates themselves against strangers, if the associates
are asserting a right which is in them either as natural persons or as a
corporation.
so. The doctrine should never be applied for the benefit of the
associates themselves to the prejudice of an innocent stranger.
Harvard Law Review, April, pP. 450-480.
The Commerce Clause of the Federal Constiution and Two Recwt
Cases Dealing With It. S. S. Gregory. The cases discussed are
Howard v.
inois Central Railroa
om any, (148 Fed. 999), and
Brooks v. Southern Pacif Comtany, (148 Fed. 986). The Statute
is the recent Act of Congress which imposes a liability upon common
carriers engaged in inter-state commerce for all damages that may
result to an employee by reason of any negligence of the carrier.
Judge Evans in the Circuit Court for the Western District of Kentucky decided that the Statute was unconstitutional in that it, in
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fact, attempted to regulate something which was not commerce at
all. Judge McCall in the Circuit Court for the Western District of
Tennessee came to practically the same conclusion. Mr. Gregory
dissents. He thinks, with all due respect to the two judges that they
have overlooked a good deal of the law on the subject and that he has
sufficient grounds for believing that if this law is fully set forth it will
show that he is right. The fact appears to be that both sides have
approached the subject with pre-conceived opinions and that they
have reached decisions in accordance with those opinions.
Mr. Gregory cites Chief Justice Marshall in the beginning of his
argument, as a matter of course. There is little doubt that this Act,
or even very much more sweeping legislation would be justified by
an appeal to his opinions, if the premises adopted for the examination
were accepted and the method of reasoning were sufficiently subtile.
Yet Chief Justice Marshall was born early enough to have come under
the influence, personal and mental, of the men who made the Constitution. Some of his most profound arguments show that he had
absorbed the theories of that "master-builder of the Constitution,"
James Wilson,- whose interpiretation of the Constitution might be
used to justify an even wider expansion of the doctrine of natiorm.
ality. Yet James Wilson was a most profound believer in the right of
the State to self goverfiment and self regulation; he believed that
that power of local self government was as essential to the existence
of the nation, as the existence of a strong central government itself.
To use John Marshall and James Wilson as exponents of doctrines malevolent or beneficient, which could never possibly have occurred to them,
is to belittle them. The opponents of the Constitutionwhen it was before
the people of the separate states for confirmation or rejection, did
most violently contend that the national government was "a consolidated government" which would swallow upL those of the separate
states. Wilson, McKean, Madison, and all the men who had to nake
the fight for the Constitution before the congresses of the several
states, had to deny this accusation with all the power of argument
and all the depth of reasoning at their command. * We owe to the fact
that they were successful, the existence *of our Constitution. ' It is
-idle, therefore, to claim that they, or the men who were trained in
their ideas, favored "a consolidated government" in the sense in
which their opponents spoke. Mr. Gregory at the end of his article
again appeals to Marshall as saying that he nor any man could foresee
conditions. Perhaps it.might not be too much to suggest that he was
sufficiently able to understand certain immutable principles upon
which the men of his day and of the preceding generation did believe
the Constitution was founded.
LABOp.
Crucial Issues in Labor Legislation. Jeremiah Smith. Mr. Smith
continues in this paper his series of exhaustive examinations into
these "Crucial Issues." In this paper he takes up the well known
line of cases represented by Plant v. Woods; Allen v. Flood; Temperton v. Russel, Quinn v. Leatham, and the Moul Steamship Company
v. McGregor. As in the previous papers Mr. Smith presents the
various sides of what may be termed a controversy upon the points
covered by these cases; as before, while there is a judicial and impartial presentation, there is no judicial decision. The scholarly examination, however, does doubtless, clear the air for the decision which"
will ultimately be worked out, not, it seems probable, in the closet,
but in the court room and the legislative hall.
HarvardLaw Review, April, PP. 429-455.
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Conditions in Contracts. George P. Costigan, Jr. The "Rules on
Conditions in Contracts," which Professor Langdell formulated for
the use of the students in his classes at Harvard, "constitute the insmiration and the foundation of this article." This fact alone is sumcient to make one turn with interest to the article, which, nevertheless is hampered by the form which this following of the rules implies.
Upon some points Mr. Costigan prefers to follow his former teacher,
Professor Williston, and to them both he credits all merit that may
be found in the article. An examination will show, however, that
Mr. Costigan has contributed a good deal of valuable matter, and has
made an excellent analysis of the subject, contributing in addition
some interesting notes upon points which are as yet controvertible.
Columbia Law Review, March, pp. IS'-'71.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

The Treaty-Making Power and the Reserved Sovereignty of the States.
Arthur K. Kun. The author declines to discuss the merits of the
Japanese-California-school question, but takes up the limitations
upon the treat,-makin gwer, which have "never been authoritatively defined.' The Mafia riots of i891 are first discussed, and it is
claimed that the government avoided the issue, but that this will
not always be possible, or even desirable, as "the shoe may be on the
other foot." In stating the case of Ware v. Hylon, and the weight to
be given to that decision, it seems to be implied (p. 176) that only
one of the judges in that case (Paterson) had been a member of the
Constitutional Convention of 1787.

Mr. Wilson, however, was one

of the most important members, if not in many respects the most
important member, of the Convention. In view of his very strong
and valuable theories this may be found to be a matter of some importance, since Mr. Wilson's views of the inter-relations between the
states and the nation were more profound and original than those of
any other member. Mr. Kuhn has approached his thesis with a mind
in which there is a broad distinction between the "States rights
theories" and those theories which do not seem to have acuired an
particular name or status but may perhaps, be called national.
inclines to the latter theories. This being so it is not necessary to
state that he feels that the "treaty-making power must reside centrally or nowhere." It would be equally certain that a writer holding
the " states rights theories" would decide that it must reside "nowhere" if the rights of the states be ignored. With preconceived
ideas of this sort it is impossible that an argument on either side can
be of value, but it may be entertaining and Mr. Kuhn's article is
interesting.
Columbia Law Review, March, pp. 172-18.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Tihs Japanes S hoo Incident at San Francisco from the Poinst of

View of International and Constitutional Law.

Theodore P. Ion. In

this article we have perhaps as fair a discussion of the points at issue,
as has appeared in legal periodical literature. We do not see, as the
discussion of the first case is in progress, just which theory of interpretation Mr. Ion has a thesis to uphold, and, in fact, we do not discover it at any point of the discussion. It would seem, if the matter
had been look ed upon f ram this eminently reasonable and common
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sense point of view that it would have very early appeared that the
incident was, as he calls it "insignificant in itself," although possibly
not so in its consequences.
In the international aspect the question as to whether the treaty
with Japan was violated or not, by the action of the San Francisco
School Board, is treated with care. The conclusion is that, "there
is a well established principle of the law of nations that aliens whilst
residing in foreign territory cannot by right obtain admittance to the
educational institutions of such country, unless there is a treaty
stipulation expressly mentioning the grant of such a privilege and
that, the mere right of residence with all its privileges cannot be considered as being sufficient, to justify a claim for admittance by foreigners to such educational institutions. Therefore, the claim of
Japan, that her treaty rights have been violated by the action of the
Board of Education at San Francisco, does not seem to be founded
either in theory or in usage; but as a sovereign power Japan is at full
liberty, if she considers the action of the California authorities as an
act of discourtesy, to resort to 'retortion', i.e., to apply the same
treatment to students from California residing in Japan or she may
even extend such retaliation to all American students within her
territory, But between a violation of a treaty right and an infringement of the rules of the 'comity of nations,' there is a great difference;
the former giving the right to denunciate a treaty, the latter justifying a state in resorting only to friendly retaliations."
The second question touched is whether the segregation of pupils
of Mongolian descent is constitutional and does not violate the 14th
Amendment. The discussion here is more closely along the lines
usually argued in connection with this case, but it appears to be more
logically arranged than most. The conclusion is that, 'if the Japanese.
during their residence here, are placed on the same footing with the
citizens of the United States by the clause of the most favored nation
in the treaty of 1894, it is evident from the above exposition of the
settled law of the country, that their exclusion from schools designed
for white pupils, cannot be considered as a discrimination and consequently there is no violation of a treaty right."
The third and last question examined is "whether a treaty concluded by the United States Government and ratified by the Senate.
can supercede all State rights." On this point Mr. Ion finds no absolute yes or no. There remains, after a discussion of the cases, a "divergence of opinion" which leans to one side or the other, but which
neither side can absolutely claim. But in regard to the specific claim
of Japan Mr. Ion says that "neither in the letter nor in the spirit of
the treaty of 1894 with Japan, is.there anything which substantiates
the claim of the Japanese government to the right of education for
her subjects in the public schools of the States of the Union, or in
those under the control of the Federal Government; that such a
right cannot be deduced from the wording of the treaty and it can
only be acquired by a special stipulation, and such is not the present

case."
Michigan Law Review, March, pp. 326-343.
LEGAL EDUCATION.
The Opportunities and Responsibilities of American Law Schools.
Floyd R. Mechem. Mr. Mechem touches upon the growth of the
American Law School, and shows that it has, within a quarter of a
century, superceded the teaching of law in the law offices. He speaks
of the enlarged demand for men and equipment, "for better men and
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better equipment." This means, as he says, a greatly enlarged oportunity and an equal responsibility. The law school must be the place
where the best legal teaching is to be found, and the best methods
used. He does not want to place too much stress upon methods, but
thinks that "under the right circumstances and conditions, the careful study of decided cases is best calculated to attain the ends we seek."
But he believes that "the man is more than the method" and that
great teachers have done much with other means. He thinks it will
be a mistake to place in our law schools too many men who have had
no practical experience at the Bar. "I believe that, in the main, no
man can be really the best teacher of the law who has had no experience in practice." "Law, as it looks to the theorist in his study and
law as it looks to the lawyer in consultation or the court room, are
often radically different things."
The law school must also be the place where "the most original
and most scholarly investigation is carried on." Here the law teacher
has the best opportunity. "He has unsurpassed library facilities,
he has the advantage of consultation with his colleagues who are also
experts in cognate fields and he has the opportunity of hearing the
discussions and answering the objections of successive classes of bright
students whose arguments in many cases . . . would do credit to
the older members of the bar." 7he development of legal history;
of the scientific side of the law; to serve the state in its legislation;
and the state officers as counsellor, are also a part of the work of the
law school, as Mr. Mechem believes. He emphasizes the duty of the
law school to develop the ethical side of the law and the profession.
"Law is the official moral code of the community. It is the organized
and manifest expression of the public sense of justice. It endeavors
to establish and enforce what is believed to be the highest practical,
workable, livable, ethical code."
"The ethics of the profession must also look to the law school for
their inspiration and support, surely no duty of the law school can be
greater than this. It has within its halls the Bench and Bar of the
future. They are there at their most plastic and impressionable age.
At no period in their lives can right standards and right ideals be more
certainly created. During this period must be sown the seeds which
shall bear a harvest in after life. The reputation of the school may
also be made to serve a useful purpose in this particular. To a pride
in their profession and its requirements there may be added a pride
in their law school connection which shall be an anchor when tempta:
tion overtakes them."
Michigan Law Review, March, pp. ,44-33..

BIOGRAPHY.

James Wilsots-Nation Builder. Lucien Hugh Alexander. The
third part of this very interesting series, takes Mr. Wilson through a
period of his life immediately preceding the Constitutional Convention,
when his activities were immensely varied, noting especiallyr his services in regard to the Bank of North America, and Hamilton s indebtedness to him in his report to Washington on the Finances. His services in the great convention are set forth in detail, showing how allembracing were the activities into which he put forth such energies as:
Green~
~~~~~i BaMrce.
3-46":
few men possess. No one more than Mr.
Alexander,
appreciates
the
profound depth of Mr. Wilson's thought, or the extent of the servicei
erendered to his country.
Gre

CURRENT LEGAL PERIODICALS.
BIOGRAPHY.

Thomas Mcln yre Cooley. Jerome C. Knowlton. As teacher of the
law, as judge, as author, the subject of this sketch is so well known to
men of these three classes, that it might be said there was little new
to say of him. He belonged to what may now be called a conservative school of constitutional interpretation and Mr. Knowlton says.
"It is easy to understand what would have been the views of Judge
Cooley n many of the questions that have been troubling us durn
the past ten years. regarding our out-lying dependencies. He would
have been an anti-expansionist and possibly an anti-imperialist, but
of this we are not so certain, for he was a firm believer in a strong
government when control was once assumed or acquired through the
exigencies of war. He recognized the law of necessity, but was slow
to cast aside implied limitations in our national Constitution on any
ground of expediency or policy. He was not impressed with our
manifest destiny as a world power. The verdict of history is not in
accord with his views on the annexation of Hawaii."
Mibhigan Law Review, March, pp. 3o9-32s5.
MONOPOLIES.

Monopolies and the Law. Frank B. Kellogg. The argument is
strongly in favor of the power of the Federal government to deal with
this question of monopoly. Mr. Kellogg asks, "If at common law a
grant of monopoly to a single person or corporation was void because
it destroyed freedom of trade, discouraged labour and industry which
should be free to all the subjects of the realm, why is it not void for
the same reasons when accomplished by a single individual or corporation by other methods? If it is against the policy of the law to grant
perpetual monopoly in any commerce, which would deprive the' people of the right to engage in that industry, how is it less against the
policy of the law for a single corporation or indiVidual to gain control
of all the commerce in a particular article, through purcha;e or acquisition of competing properties, or through any other means or device?
We are not invoking a new principle against an old device, but an old
principle against a new device. Principles are everlasting. Devices
change. In our opinion it is against the terms and the spirit of the
Sherman Act for any man or set of men, through the form of corporate
action, to acquire dominant and controlling power over any commerce,
with intent to monopolize that comrherce, whether this be done
through the form of purchase of competing properties, or in any other
form.' He notes the fact, mentioned by other writers on the subject,
that the excuse of freedom of contract may be used to make men
unfree. Mr. Kellogg does not favour indiscriminate legislation or
ignorant fulminations against wealth in general or corporations in
particular, but he does believe in intelligent legislative rection and
limitation of great industries, and he also believes that the Federal
Government has alone the power toproperly control these activities.
&reen Bag, March, pp. 147-255.
CORPORATIONS.

The Imprisonment of Criminal Corporations. Donald R. Richberg.
This article continues a discussion aroused by a former article on the
Imprisonment of Corporations, which was dissented from by Mr.
Frederick N. Judson, in the December number of the Green Bag.
Mr. Judson did not think that increased pepalties would diminish the
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offences; he did think that the public at large would suffer; that preventive remedies are more efficacious than punitive, and that individual responsibilities should be increased. In regard to the first
point Mr. Richberg says that in dealing with corporations we have
not to deal with the emotions and psychology of human beings, but
that we have a business proposition to face, pure and simple. Therefore we have not the same reasons for dispensing with harsh punishments as in the case of a human being. We have to find the deterrent
punishment and apply it. The only innocent parties likely to suffer
would be "those parties who have been led by false representation to
invest their money in an illegal concern." It is very pertinently asked
why such persons should be protected by a law which protects no
others of their class. Mir. Richberg is apparently right when he claims
that such innocent persons have a perfectly good opportunity to inform themselves as to the stock in which they are investing, and the
conditions surrounding them and therefore have little standing in a
court of law as innocent purchasers. In any reform these stockholders
always.arise to suppress any action in regard to monopolistic corporations, threatening to make any and all persons suffer if their interests
are imperilled for the general good. It does not seem likely that the
public would suffer, as Mr. Richberg says, by the "substitution of
government control of enterprises for private criminal control." The
suggestion that preventive remedies are more efficacious than punitive ones, is accepted by Mr. Richberg, but he adds "the preventive
remedy suggested-that of injunction-has been in existence for many
decades and our present system of wide monopolistic control of practically every important industry bears eloquent witness to the efficacy
of this remedy.'
He also suggests that "as long as it is necessary to
have punitive laws by the thousands on the statute books to hold
fear before the eyes of the private individual, it will also be necessary
to have punitive laws to restrain the pernicious activities of artificial
persons."
Green Bag, March,
pp. x$6-z62.

Equitable Interests in Foreign Property. Joseph H. Beale, Jr. Mr.
Beale summarizes the conclusions as to the first part of his article as
follows, "An equitable interest in land can be created only by the law
of the situs: if that law creates an interest, the courts of all other
states must recognize and enforce it; while, if the law of the situs does
not create the equitable interest, no foreign court can assume the existence of such an interest. But since equity acts in personam it has
power to act wherever it has jurisdiction over the person of a defendant; and if a defendant is shown to be in default for a breach of obligati6n, it may, in some cases at least, decree a conveyance of land by
way of reparation for the injury, although there was no prior interest
in the land created by the law of the situs." The limitations of the
power are then examined, as are the principles regulating trusts of
moveables.
HarvardLaw Review, March, pp. 382-397.

